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Our President Maria Ślązak has been invited to deliver a speech during Round Table of the Chamber of Advocates of the Republic of Uzbekistan “Prospects for the Development of the Legal Profession in the Context of Reforms of the Judicial and Legal System”. Maria focused on the issue of relevance of international cooperation for development of legal profession. It has to be underlined that AEA-EAL statutory task and goal is to promote international cooperation of legal profession. Such collaboration is of huge importance not only for Bars, Law Societies and organizations, but also for lawyers and law offices allowing networking, exchange of experiences, knowledge and views as well as information on developments in other countries.
The Round Table took part within the framework of the II International Legal Forum “Tashkent Law Spring”, which was organized online on April 22-23 this year. The main organizer of the forum was the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
The Constitutional Court of Belgium has requested a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) about exceptions to reporting tax arrangements under the EU Council’s Directive 2018/822 (DAC6).
On February 19, 2021, The Belgium high court, Grondwettelijk Hof, filed a request for an opinion from the CJEU (case C-694/20) regarding a DAC6 issue that the Flemish Bar Council and Belgian Association of Tax Lawyers raised on December 21 2020. The legal organisations are seeking to suspend reporting certain tax arrangements under the EU Directive because it would impede on the legal rights of “intermediaries” under the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.
Subject of the action in the main proceedings
The action in the main proceedings concerns claims for the suspension and annulment, in whole or in part, of the Flemish decreet van 26 juni 2020 tot wijziging van het decreet van 21 juni 2013 betreffende de administratieve samenwerking op het gebied van de belastingen, wat betreft de verplichte automatische uitwisseling van inlichtingen op belastinggebied met betrekking tot meldingsplichtige grensoverschrijdende constructies (Decree of 26 June 2020 amending the Decree of 21 June 2013 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation as regards the mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements; ‘the Decree of 26 June 2020’). Those claims were brought by the Orde van Vlaamse Balies (Flemish Bar Council), the de facto association, ‘Belgian Association of Tax Lawyers’ and others.
Subject and legal basis of the request for a preliminary ruling
The request for a preliminary ruling concerns the compatibility of Article 1(2) of Directive (EU) 2018/822 with Article 7 (right to respect for private life) and Article 47 (right to a fair trial) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in so far as it requires a lawyer-intermediary who wishes to invoke professional secrecy, to notify the other intermediaries involved of their reporting obligations.
The request is made pursuant to Article 267 TFEU.
The question referred
Does Article 1(2) of Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 1 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements infringe the right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the right to respect for private life as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in that the new Article 8ab(5) which it inserted in Council Directive 2011/16/EU 2 of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, provides that, where a Member State takes the necessary measures to give intermediaries the right to waiver from filing information on a reportable cross-border arrangement where the reporting obligation would breach the legal professional privilege under the national law of that Member State, that Member State is obliged to require the intermediaries to notify, without delay, any other intermediary or, if there is no such intermediary, the relevant taxpayer, of their reporting obligations, in so far as the effect of that obligation is to oblige a lawyer acting as an intermediary to share with another intermediary, not being his client, information which he obtains in the course of the essential activities of his profession, namely, representing or defending clients in legal proceedings and giving legal advice, even in the absence of pending legal proceedings?
Provisions of European Union law cited
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Articles 7, 8, 20, 21, 47, 48, 49 and 51.
Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements: Article1, paragraph 2
European Convention on Human Rights: Articles 6 and 8.
Provisions of national law cited
Grondwet (Constitution): Articles 22 and 29.
Decreet van 21 juni 2013 betreffende de administratieve samenwerking op het gebied van belastingen (Decree of 21 June 2013 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation): Articles 11/6 and 11/7.
Decreet van 26 juni 2020 tot wijziging van het decreet van 21 juni 2013 betreffende de administratieve samenwerking op het gebied van de belastingen, wat betreft de verplichte automatische uitwisseling van inlichtingen op belastinggebied met betrekking tot meldingsplichtige grensoverschrijdende constructies (Decree of 26 June 2020 amending the Decree of 21 June 2013 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross- border arrangements): Articles 14 and 15.
Brief summary of the facts and the procedure in the main proceedings
By applications of 31 August 2020 and 1 October 2020, the applicants lodged claims with the Constitutional Court for the suspension and annulment, in whole or in part, of the above-mentioned Decree of 26 June 2020.Main submissions of the parties to the main proceedings
The applicants submit that Article 14 of the Decree of 26 June 2020 infringes Articles 22 and 29 of the Constitution, whether or not read in conjunction with Articles6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and with Articles 7, 8, 20, 21, 47, 48, 49 and 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. They contend that, pursuant to Article 11/6, § 1(1)(1o) of the Decree of 21 June 2013, as inserted by Article 14 of the Decree of 26 June 2020, the lawyer-intermediary who wishes to invoke professional secrecy is required to inform the other intermediaries involved, in writing and giving reasons, that he cannot fulfil his reporting obligation. They argue that it is impossible to fulfil that requirement without breaching professional secrecy. Moreover, such a requirement is not necessary to ensure that the cross-border arrangement is reported, since the client, whether assisted by the lawyer or not, can inform the other intermediaries and ask them to fulfil their reporting obligation.
The Flemish Government submits that there is no problem where the other intermediary referred to in the decree is the client of the lawyer-intermediary or where the client has put him in touch with the lawyer. Where that is not the case and the lawyer is not working with the other intermediary, he would also be unaware of the latter’s existence and the reporting obligation is shifted to the taxpayer.
Brief summary of the reasons for the referral
The Decree of 26 June 2020 transposes Directive (EU) 2018/822 into national law. It is apparent from recital 2 of that directive that the directive forms part of the framework of the European Union’s efforts to facilitate tax transparency at EU level. In practice, the Member States must designate a competent authority to assume responsibility for the exchange between Member States of the necessary information about aggressive tax arrangements. In order to ensure that such information is available to the competent authorities, the directive introduces a reporting obligation with respect to potentially aggressive cross-border tax arrangements. The reporting obligation is primarily incumbent on the so-called intermediaries who are usually involved in the implementation of such arrangements. However, if there are no such intermediaries, or if they are able to invoke a legal professional privilege, the reporting obligation shifts to the taxpayer. In order to transpose that reporting obligation in the Flemish Region, the Decree of 26 June 2020 makes a number of amendments to the Decree of 21 June 2013.
Article 11/6 of the Decree of 21 June 2013, as inserted by Article 14 of the Decree of 26 June 2020, determines the way in which the reporting obligation relates to the professional secrecy by which certain intermediaries are bound. By virtue of that provision, an intermediary who is bound by professional secrecy is exempt from the reporting obligation only if he informs the other intermediary or intermediaries involved or, if there is no such intermediary, the taxpayer(s), in writing and giving reasons, of the fact that he is unable to comply with the reporting obligation. In particular, Article 11/6 provides as follows:‘§ 1. When an intermediary is bound by professional secrecy, he is required:1o to notify any other intermediary or intermediaries in writing, giving reasons, that he is unable to comply with the reporting obligation, as a result of which that reporting obligation automatically rests with the other intermediary or intermediaries;2° in the absence of any other intermediary, to notify the relevant taxpayer or taxpayers of their reporting obligation, in writing, giving reasons.[…]”
A lawyer’s professional secrecy is an essential component of the right to respect for private life and the right to a fair trial. According to the case-law of the Grondwettelijk Hof (Constitutional Court), the information that lawyers are required to pass on to the competent authorities about their clients is protected by professional secrecy if such information relates to activities covered by the lawyer’s specific task of legal defence or representation and the provision of legal advice. The mere fact of having had recourse to a lawyer results in protection under professional secrecy. The same applies a fortiori to the identity of a lawyer’s clients. The information that is protected by professional secrecy in respect of the authorities is also protected in respect of other actors, such as, for example, any other intermediaries who may be involved. The rule of professional secrecy should only be waived if this can be justified by an overriding reason relating to the public interest and if the waiver of secrecy is strictly proportionate. According to the travaux préparatoires leading to the adoption of the Decree of 26 June 2020, an intermediary’s obligation to notify the other intermediaries involved, giving reasons, that he is invoking professional secrecy and will therefore be unable to comply with the reporting obligation, would be necessary in order to meet the requirements of that directive, and to ensure that invoking professional secrecy does not prevent the necessary reporting from taking place.
Where a lawyer can be regarded as an intermediary within the meaning of the Decree of 21 June 2013, his client will in principle be either the taxpayer or another intermediary. If the lawyer’s client is another intermediary, professional secrecy does not prevent the lawyer from reminding his client of his reportingobligation. If the lawyer’s client is the taxpayer and other intermediaries are involved in the reportable arrangement, it will be apparent from Article 11/7 of the Decree of 21 June 2013, as inserted by Article 15 of the Decree of 26 June 2020, that in any case, the reporting obligation is also incumbent on the other intermediaries involved, unless they can provide written proof of the fact that another intermediary has already complied with the reporting obligation. If the lawyer’s professional secrecy prevents him from notifying another intermediary of the fact that he will not be complying with the reporting obligation, he will a fortiori not be able to provide that other intermediary with written proof that he has complied with the reporting obligation. In that case, every other intermediary involved remains automatically bound by the reporting obligation. Consequently, the question arises whether the obligation incumbent on the intermediary under Article 11/6, § 1, first paragraph, 1 °, of the Decree of 21 June 2013, is justified by an overriding reason relating to the public interest.
According to Article 2 of the Decree of 26 June 2020, the objective of that decree is to transpose Directive (EU) 2018/822 into national law. Article 1(2) of that directive inserts Article 8ab(5) into Directive 2011/16/EU, and reads as follows:‘Each Member State may take the necessary measures to give intermediaries the right to a waiver from filing information on a reportable cross-border arrangement where the reporting obligation would breach the legal professional privilege under the national law of that Member State. In such circumstances, each Member State shall take the necessary measures to require intermediaries to notify, without delay, any other intermediary or, if there is no such intermediary, the relevant taxpayer of their reporting obligations under paragraph 6.Intermediaries may only be entitled to a waiver under the first subparagraph to the extent that they operate within the limits of the relevant national laws that define their professions.’
It follows from the foregoing that the obligation incumbent on the intermediary who invokes legal professional privilege to notify other intermediaries or the taxpayer of their reporting obligations, was laid down by the regional legislature pursuant to Directive (EU) 2018/822. According to the Constitutional Court, it must take this element into account before evaluating the compatibility of the decree with the Constitution. However, the Constitutional Court is not competent to rule on the compatibility of the aforementioned Directive with Articles 7 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Since the actions for suspension and annulment of the Decree of 26 June 2020, which transposes Directive (EU) 2018/822, call into question the latter’s validity, the validity of the aforementioned Directive must first be determined. Consequently, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU, the question formulated above should be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling.
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We have a pleasure to inform you that as a consequence of the very successful webinar on mediation which took place on January 28, 2021 the AEA-EAL Board decided to establish a Mediation Committee to promote alternative dispute resolution mechanism among legal profession, to promote use of the mediation by lawyers and to provide knowledge and know-how on this tool.
We invite AEA-EAL Members, who are mediators or who wish to deal with this issue to join the Mediation Committee. Please send your submissions to secretary-general@aea-eal.eu cc office@aea-eal.eutill April 16, 2021.
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Last week Federation of European Bars (FBE) elected a new Presidency with the following Officers:
President : Dominique ATTIAS (FR)
1st Vice-President : Bas MARTENS (NL)
2nd Vice-President : Izabela KONOPACKA (PL)
We congratulate new Presidency members wishing successful term of office. It has to be underlined that friendly relations have bound AEA-EAL and FBE in the past resulting with organisation of common events, seminars and conferences.
We invite you to read a very interesting article by Izabela Konopacka, newly elected FBE Second Vice-President, on IP and Privacy Rights as Fundamental Rights; the text can be found here.
The three sources of fundamental rights in the European Union undoubtedly reflect the complicated nature of the Union’s legal system.
Firstly, since the 1960s there has been continual development of a system of fundamental rights protection based on the general principles taken from Member State Constitutions. In turn, we can find them in the Court of Justice of the European Union’s jurisprudence.
Secondly, the Union has adopted its own Fundamental Rights in the form of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which as a „written Bill of Rights” offers EU citizens a structured set of rights and makes it easier to use them.
Thirdly, there is a system of fundamental rights protection based on the European Convention on Human Rights. This directly affects the Member States and indirectly the EU system as a whole. Following the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s ability to become a party to the Convention was confirmed. However, as we all know, it has not been accepted yet, therefore, we cannot make a complaint to the Court of Human Rights against the EU because it is not a signatory to the Convention.
Human Rights/Fundamental Rights involved
When it comes to how our fundamental rights are protected under the Charter and Convention we see the overlap between the two treaties. Furthermore, these have been interpreted and expanded by the Court of Human Rights. The EU, for example, has developed fundamental rights into legislation showing some of the differences between the institutions.
For example, Article 10 of the Convention protects our right to have our own opinions and to express them freely without government interference, Public protest, Freedom of the press and the same rights are mirrored under article 11 of the Charter
Article 8 of the Charter sets out the right to the protection of personal data, but the EU carries this further with, a whole range of specific protection such as the GDPR. The Convention expresses this differently, where the Court on Human Rights has emphasised that Article 8 includes private and family life, home, and correspondence including mail, telephone communications and e-mails in the workplace.
The ‘freedom to conduct a business’ in the charter on human rights, article 16 has been recognised by the CJEU to exercise an economic or commercial activity as we might expect. However, because the Convention also applies to legal entities, their rights are protected too.
Having said this, there is an established concern about the standard of protection given at supranational level as well as the concern if and how the CJEU should allow Member States to apply their own, national, standard of rights protection as different from the EU standard when a situation falls within the scope of EU law remains controversial.
The above point was addressed in Melloni (C-399/11) where the CJEU gave its opinion on the primacy and uniformity of EU law. The case highlighted the difficult nature of rights protection in the EU. However, it also showed that the CJEU admitted that the level of protection for fundamental rights, for example, a right to a fair trial, may be lower than the level of protection guaranteed by the Convention because of the supremacy of EU law.
The above case also shows the differences between the two European Courts, while the Court on Human Rights interprets the Convention’s rights as a minimum standard, the EU mainly interprets EU rights standard as a maximum. Perhaps the jury is still out, and I should ask the rhetorical question. When it comes to human rights in Europe, are there really two rules and two protections?
Protection of copyrighted work on the Internet and Service Provider Liability
We are all aware of the development of the Internet with new IT technologies contributing to largely uncontrolled exploitation of property protected by IP rights, including materials covered by copyright protection.
Apart from the problem of copyright infringement by individual Internet users or just end-users. There is the issue of the liability of businesses providing services on the Internet, who do not use the materials themselves but make the technical infrastructure available that enables their transmission, storage and use – and so contribute to copyright infringement.
As a response to this, the Electronic Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC) was intended to provide so-called “legal security” by ensuring effective copyright protection on the Internet, but also safeguarding the interests of internet service providers.
Under Polish jurisdiction, the issue of liability for infringement of third party rights including copyright by service providers operating online is governed by the Provision of the Electronic Services Act of 18 July 2002. (Journal of Laws of 2002, No. 144, item 1204, as amended).
Under this statute, businesses providing services by electronic means are not obliged to verify the data they transfer, store or make available in terms of potential violations. At the same time, the act provides, like the Directive, liability exemptions which differ depending on the category of services provided. i.e. ‘mere conduit’ or pure transmission, caching and hosting.
It should be noted that the Polish Provision of Electronic Services Act substantially modifies the rules contained in The Electronic Commerce Directive on excluding liability for copyright infringement by service providers that provide hosting services.
In addition to the above statute, specific rules governing the use of copyrighted works by ISPs are set out in the Copyright and Related Rights Act of 4 February 1994. (Journal of Laws of 1994, No. 24, item 83).
It should be noted that the Polish legal system does not contain regulations typical of the “fair use” doctrine. However, It recognises the concept of ‘permitted use’ and provides that no case of permitted use can infringe the ordinary use of the work or violate the legitimate interests of the author.
The most important cases of permitted use that are set out in the Act include amongst others:
personal use;
temporary reproduction, if it is of a transitory or incidental nature, having no independent economic significance but constituting an integral and fundamental part of a technological process the purpose of which is to enable: transmission of a work through the data transmission system between third parties by an intermediary; or the lawful use of a work;
the use of works listed in the statute for information purposes (reproduction, dissemination);
the use of works by educational and research institutions for teaching and research purposes;
the right to quote;
the exhibition of artistic work by the owner of a copy (exhibiting);
It should also be made clear that Polish copyright law is based on the Latin model, which provides for the legal protection of personal copyright as well as the creator’s economic (property) copyright. Only the latter one is negotiable, which works by way of an assignment of rights. The personal copyright cannot be taken away.
Within this context, there was an interesting case of the alleged infringement of copyrighted work which was a photograph recently commented on in the Polish media concerning a famous blogger, the daughter of our former Prime Minister Donald Tusk -Make Life Easier.
This is a typical blog that could be described as a mixture of fashion and interior design with a healthy lifestyle and healthy eating recommendations.
On the last day of December Kasia (that’s the name of the blogger) informed her readers that the photo of her bedroom window that she had taken and posted on Instagram was subsequently used without her knowledge and permission by ZARA HOME for a campaign. The picture had been modified by the Zara Home and the company displayed its products on the picture.
As the blogger is a professional photographer it was assumed that the photo would fit the characteristics of a creative work, which you cannot use without the author’s consent.
Under Polish law, the mere publication of a photograph on the Internet, for example, on social media, is not the equivalent to giving such consent. However, a contract of assignment or a license agreement may authorize you to do so. Alternatively, you can also use the photo under the right of quotation. And this is where the matter becomes a little complicated. If we read Instagram’s rules carefully, it turns out that sharing, publishing or sending content using their service means granting Instagram a license to the content as well as a transferable license. This means that the service provider (in this case Instagram) can grant further licenses to other entities. So it could have been the case that Zara Home actually obtained a license from Instagram. However, even if this was the case, the copyright would have been infringed anyway.
By using the photo of Kasia Tusk, Zara Home violated more than just property rights.
So far, it is not known whether Zara Home used Kasia Tusk’s photos under a license. However, it does not change the fact that the violation actually took place. Even if not in connection with the infringement of the author’s economic rights, there is still the question of personal rights. Among them is the right to the integrity of the work.
Since the integrity of the content and the form of a work is a personal right and not a property right, it remains inextricably linked to the author. To put it simply, even if Kasia Tusk transferred the author’s economic rights in the photograph to Zara or Instagram granted the store a license, it would still have to obtain the author’s consent to make any changes to the work. However, there is no doubt that replacing elements of the photo with pillows from the store’s collection was a violation of the work’s integrity.
Jurisprudence (ECHR & CJEU) vs Law (Directives)
I risk stating the obvious, when I say that since the beginning of the Internet era, there have been ongoing discussions regarding the state of regulation concerning the scope of liability for ISPs to overcome legal security issues in terms of IP protection.
On one hand, there has been a legal concept proposed which aimed at imposing maximum responsibility for the publication of materials on the Internet on the ISPs as they have the necessary tools to remove any unlawful materials and can easily identify the perpetrators.
On the other hand, many academics and lawyers have argued that such a concept is not in keeping with the concept of a fair trial and does not ensure a fair balance between the rights of a potential claimant and other protected rights such as privacy, freedom of speech and the freedom to conduct a business.
The two directions have also been reflected in the CJEU’s Jurisprudence and other European courts. Some of them showing a liberal approach, others a very strict one in terms of the ISP liability
The most significant CJEU rulings in this context include the following cases:
– C-484/14 Tobias McFadden vs. Sony Music Entertainment (Secondary Liability for Open Wireless Networks in Germany)
In this case, the CJEU concluded that how the ISP’s liability is framed in the Electronic Commerce Directive gives theservice provider a right to supply access to a communication network as their business and that the public or society has the right to freedom of information.
– C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA vs Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM),
The main issue for the CJEU was whether under several EU Directives
[on Electronic Commerce (2000/31), the Information Society Directive (2001/29), the Enforcement Directive (2004/48), the Data Protection Directive (95/46), and the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive (2002/58) ]
and in light of applicable human rights it is correct to issue an injunction against an ISP to force them to introduce a system of filtering all electronic communications for an unlimited period, at its expense to block unlawful use or transfer of copyrighted works.
The Court concluded that Scarlet’s obligation to install a filtering system would in effect make the company carry out a costly general monitoring function for an unspecified period, contrary to the Electronic Commerce Directive.
Furthermore, the Court noted that the fundamental right to property, which includes IP rights “must be balanced against the protection of other fundamental rights.”
In – C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH vs. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and Wega Filmproduktionsgesellschaft mbH,
An ISP in this case acted as an intermediary by allowing users to access copyrighted material on their website which meant that under Article 8(3) of the Information Society Directive (2001/29/EC) the copyright holder could apply for an injunction.
The court held that a national court may issue an injunction against an ISP in such a situation, but it must be balanced against the public interest in accessing the information.
– C-324/09 L’Oréal SA and others vs eBay International AG and others
L’Oréal, the French cosmetics company, is the proprietor of several national trademarks in the UK, as well as community trademarks within the EU. The company brought infringement actions against eBay, its European subsidiaries, and individual defendants who had sold several counterfeit items resembling brand names associated with L’Oréal.
Among other claims, L’Oréal argued that eBay was liable for the use of its trademarks by displaying them on the website and the advertising-sponsored links provided by Internet search engines, such as Google. In 2009, the UK High Court stayed proceedings pending a preliminary ruling by the CJEU in light of the applicable EU directives.
The Court held that a trademark proprietor is entitled under the Trade Marks Directive (89/104) and the Community Trade Mark Regulation (40/94) to prevent the operator of an online marketplace from advertising its goods without consent which were targeted at consumers in the EU. The Court also ruled that eBay may not be exempt from liability provided under Article 14(1) of the Electronic Commerce Directive 2000/31 when it plays an active role in the sale of goods by optimizing the presentation of offers or promoting them.
Concerning eCommerce platform content filtering systems, the CJEU held that eBay is an intermediary within the meaning of the third sentence of Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive (2004/48) and the injunctions against such intermediary may be issued, however the injunctions must be effective, proportionate and deterrent, without creating restrictions on legitimate trade.
The cases and decisions I have highlighted seem to confirm that there is no uniform position for the CJEU when it comes to the IP infringement on the internet. Therefore, we might conclude that EU law, including the jurisprudence, is in a constant state of development concerning the issues discussed because of the evolution of New Technologies.
The regulators at both EU and national level have found it necessary to amend the existing provisions regarding the internet sphere and upgrade the security rules for digital platforms, services and products.
To this end the Digital Service Package will soon enter into force to complete the EU Digital Single Market.
At this point, I would like to mention that the Polish government has recently also introduced a new bill referred to as the “Freedom Act” which governs the issue of freedom of speech on the Internet.
The aim of the bill, as our Minister of Justice expressed, is to prevent ISPs from blocking content posted by internet users provided it does not violate Polish law. Under the bill the person whose posts or comments have been blocked will be able to appeal to the Council for Freedom of Speech and it will be for the Council to decide whether the measure applied by the online service provider was justified or not.
Many lawyers have taken the position that the bill contradicts the DSA project (on which the European Union, including Poland, is currently working intensively) to a certain extent by, for example, granting protection only to Polish Internet users or not defining “unlawful” content. The EU regulation on digital services, as a supranational law will supersede the Freedom Act, which may be a major complication for Polish Internet entrepreneurs who are at risk’ from having to adapt to the requirements of both acts.
Concluding the question of whether the legitimate interests of all internet users and ISPs may be fairly protected and secured under new EU legislation and Member State national laws remains still open for further discussion.
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We invite you to a webinar organised by the Polish National Bar of Attorneys-at-law and Regional Bar in Rzeszów on practical aspects of providing legal assistance in Europe. AEA-EAL speakers – Anna Mizerka from France and Viktor Bobrin from Belarus will deliver information on the topic in their respective countries. More information and registration in Polish are available below:
Napisane przez AEA - EAL w dniu . Opublikowano w News.
When?
15 April 2021 – 16 April 2021
Where?
Online
Languages
English
Objective
This seminar will take a detailed look at procedural rights in the context of evidence-gathering with a special focus on new developments in the field of e-evidence
Key topics
The gathering of cross-border evidence and its admissibility
Update on the state of play regarding the EU Directives on procedural rights, i.e. the right to information, legal aid and access to a lawyer, presumption of innocence, and the position of children in criminal proceedings
Setting a legal framework to address the challenges posed by the gathering of e-evidence
The need for further measures in the EU
Who should attend?
This seminar is targeted at judges, prosecutors and defence lawyers from all over the EU (Denmark does not participate in the Justice Programme 2014-2020).
Interactive online seminar
The online seminar will be hosted on ERA’s own online training platform. You will be able to interact immediately and directly with our top-quality speakers and other participants. We will make the most of the technical tools available to deliver an intensive, interactive training experience. As the platform is hosted on our own server, the highest security settings will be applied to ensure that you can participate safely in a high-quality online training environment.
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